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DEAN E. CYCON*

Managing Fisheries in Developing
Nations: A Plea for Appropriate
DevelopmentThe recent trend in extending coastal jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles
under the "exclusive economic zone"' concept has greatly increased the
scope of national authority of developing nations. Extended coastal jurisdiction has strengthened efforts by developing nations to secure a greater
share of benefits from living marine resources. 2 These developing nations
now have an authoritative claim to a combined ocean area that encompasses approximately 64 percent of the world's fisheries. 3 As these developing nations begin the task of managing the living resources off their
coasts, they face a range of policy options regarding the focus of development and the choice of institutional arrangements through which to
pursue their management goals. The purpose of this article is to identify
certain aspects of contemporary fisheries development and management
regimes that may have undesired, and largely unforeseen, consequences
for developing nations. Specifically, this article examines the conflict
between western-oriented management theory and technique and the cultural and socio-economic dynamics of non-western coastal fishing communities. These non-western coastal fishing communities are generally
engaged in small-scale or artisanal fishing,4 producing over 33 percent
*Research Fellow, Marine Policy & Ocean Management Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic
Institution
tResearch supported by the Pew Memorial Trust and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
Marine Policy & Ocean Management Center
1. The "exclusive economic zone" is an extension of coastal state authority and control beyond
the traditional territorial sea. Under this principle coastal states extend their sovereignty over this
area for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing the living and non-living
natural resources of the seabed and superadjacent waters. See U. N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, U.N. CLOS at Part V., arts. 55-57, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, (1982). Prior to the advent
of the Convention, fifty-nine coastal states had made unilateral declarations to establish exclusive
economic zones. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, THE EXCLUSIVE
ECONOMIC ZONE OF THE UNITED STATES: SOME IMMEDIATE POLICY IssuES 25 (1984). The United
States declared its own zone by presidential proclamation on March 10, 1983. Id. at 101.
2. See Lucas & Loftus, FAO's EEZ Program:Helping to Build the Fisheries of the Future in 3
OCEAN Y.B. 38 (M. Borghese & N. Ginsburg, eds. 1983).
3. Bell, World-wide EconomicAspects ofExtendedFisheryJurisdictionManagementin ECONOMIC
IMPACTS OF ExTENDED FISHERY JURISDIcrION 14 (Anderson, ed. 1977).
4. The term "small-scale," or "artisanal" fisheries refers to those communities or individuals
whose fishing technology, techniques, and productive organization sharply contrast with modem,
large-scale fishing enterprises or industries. Artisanal fishermen use small craft that are either rowed,
sailed, or utilize low horsepower engines. Their fishing techniques and equipment were developed
and passed on from generation to generation, changing little except that manufactured synthetic
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of the food fish consumed worldwide and an even greater percentage of
the fish consumed in the developing world.'
The present conceptual and institutional orientation of fisheries development and management will negatively impact these coastal communities. The present fishery models do little to guarantee the efficient
utilization and preservation of fishery stocks, or to insure broad-based
economic growth. Such results, however, are not predetermined. A development scheme predicated upon utilization of indigenous management
systems and oriented toward local development can assure developing
nations of the full benefits of their extended authority.
THE "STACKED DECK"-THE PREDICATES AND PROMISES OF
CONTEMPORARY FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT
Policy makers in developing nations seek rational, efficient exploitation
of the living marine resources off their coasts for the broad goals of
national development. However, the fisheries management concepts and
techniques upon which these policy makers rely are socially and economically ill-suited to address the specific needs of their coastal communities and broader national development goals. Furthermore, the
international assistance regime exacerbates this mismatch by orienting
fisheries development into resource exploitation patterns that inhibit longterm, broad-based development. In this section, the interrelated development and management components of contemporary fisheries development will be examined. It will be seen that these components, as
presently constituted, combine to "stack the deck" of policy choices
toward large-scale, export-oriented development, with only secondary
consideration given to internal national needs.
The PredominantFisheriesManagement Paradigm
The dominant theoretical foundation of fisheries management is the
product of European and American economic thought. This system will
be referred to as the "western model" in this article.
The western model begins with the proposition that fisheries must be
managed to eliminate or mitigate the consequences flowing from the
materials now often replace the formerly home-produced gear. "Productive organization, community
structure, and many forms of social interaction among artisanal fishermen evolved from familial and
kinship ties. Their low productive potential is only partially oriented to a market economy, as a
substantial part of daily catches is designated for home consumption." Sabella, Jose Olaya-Analysis
of a Peruvian Fishing CooperativeThat Failed, 53 ANrHRo. Q. 56, 57 (1980).
5. Ben-Yami, Community Fisheries Centres and the Transfer of Technology to Small-scale Fisheries, 19 INDO-PAcinc FISH. CouNcIL PRoc. 936, 937 (1980).

Winter 1986]

MANAGING FISHERIES IN DEVELOPING NATIONS

"common property" ' 6 nature of fisheries resources. 7 Common property is
the traditional characterization of North Atlantic fisheries.8 There are two
significant consequences to the common property condition of fishery
development. First, there is a tendency to waste the resource physically.
Since there is no limitation on access to the fishery, nor any private
ownership, there is no reason for a fisherman to limit his catch; anything
left for another day's effort may be freely taken by others. Thus, there
is incentive to overexploit fish stocks.9 This may be viewed as an oceanic
version of the "Tragedy of the Commons.' Second, there is a tendency
toward economic waste. If a fishery appears profitable, it will attract new
entrants, who will put additional pressure on the resource base and may
depress prices by raising total catch. More significantly, a larger number
of fishermen going after a decreasing stock encourages investment in
larger vessels and more sophisticated gear as each fisherman is faced with
the need to increase efforts to maintain his share of the available catch."
The western model employs a number of management techniques to
overcome the waste inherent in this view of fisheries. These techniques
include limiting the quantity of fish taken, limiting the gear type or style,
and limiting entry to the fishery. Limiting the catch quantity serves the
economic purpose of keeping fish prices high and the conservation purpose of preventing stock depletion. Limiting gear type or style 2 may
6. The concept of "common property" is a manifestation of the principle of communal ownership
dating back to pre-Norman England. See Juergensmeyer and Wadley, The Common Lands Concept:
A 'Commons' Solution to a Common EnvironmentalProblem, 14 NAT. Ras. J. 361 (1974). In the
modem resource management context, common property generally refers to a distribution of property
rights in resources in which a number of owners are co-equal in their rights of usage. CiriacyWantrup & Bishop, 'Common Property' as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy, 15 NAT. RES.
J. 714 (1975).
7. The seminal articles analyzing the "common property" characteristics of fisheries are Gordon,
The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. EcoN. 124 (1954);
and Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. EcoN. 116 (1955). A more
recent advocate of sole ownership is Keen, Common Property in Fisheries: Is Sole Ownership an
Option?, 7 MARINE POL. 197 (1983).
8. See, e.g., F. Christy, Territorial Use Rights in Marine Fisheries: Definitions and Conditions
(FAO Fish Tech. Pap. No. 227, 1982).
9. This aspect of the common property nature of fisheries is described by T. Panayotou, Management Concept for Small-scale Fisheries: Economic and Social Aspects (FAO Fish Tech. Pap.
No. 228, 1982).
10. In Hardin's classic metaphor, each individual pasturing his herd on common land will increase
the size of the herd without concern for the communal consequences. The commons will become
overgrazed, and all herders will suffer ruin. See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScIENCE
1243 (1968). Hardin's vision has been applied to the living resources of the oceans by W. HALE &
D. WnrrusEN, WORLD FisiERIsS: A TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS? (Woodrow Wilson Monograph
Series in Public Affairs No. 4, 1971).
11. This analysis has been applied to the Newfoundland cod fisheries in Sinclair, Fishermen
Divided: The Impact of Limited Entry Licensing on Northwest Newfoundland, 42 HuM. ORG. 307,
308-09 (1983).
12. E.g., minimum mesh sizes for gill nets.
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prevent harvesting of immature fish, and thereby increase the fish size
and quantity in the coming season. It also serves to limit total catch and
support higher market prices. Limiting entry by means of licensing is
designed to eliminate the negative effects on fishermen's incomes of overparticipation and over-capitalization of fully utilized fisheries. In order
to achieve economic efficiency, the western model encourages concentration of capital into fewer, more modem vessels and related technologies, with a consequent limitation on the overall labor devoted to a fishery.
The Contemporary Fisheries Development Model
The present orientation of fisheries planning for the developing world
is best illustrated by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) program for development and management of fisheries in exclusive economic
zones. 3 The three principal objectives of the FAO program are: (1) to
strengthen the capabilities of coastal countries to manage and develop
their fisheries; (2) to promote rational management and full use of fisheries
resources in coastal zones; and (3) to strengthen efforts by developing
nations to secure a greater share of, and higher benefit from, living marine
resources.' 4 The FAO plan of action to pursue these objectives is twofold. First, in order to meet the most urgent needs of the developing
country, the plan of action would (a) assess national fisheries opportunities
and provide technical assistance for catching, processing, and implementing business management; (b) train skilled administrators and managers for the management and development of fisheries zones; and (c)
promote and mobilize funding from bilateral and multilateral sources,
focusing on development and capital projects. Second, there would be a
long-term analysis of development options based on social, economic,
and technical studies of all aspects of fisheries.' 5 The contemporary fisheries development model envisioned by FAO calls for expansion of fishing
effort through capital investment, introduction of improved catch technology, expansion of processing facilities, and organization of markets.' 6
Development and ManagementApplied: Confronting the Mismatch
The development and management systems described above appear
rationally directed toward an economic goal of efficient exploitation of
fisheries stocks. When applied in many developing nations, however, the
13. The FAO program is discussed in COMM. ON FISHERIES, UN FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., FAO FISH
TECH. REP. No. 228, Report of the Thirteenth Session of the Committee on Fisheries 1-6 (1979);
see also Lucas & Loftus, supra note 2.
14. Lucas & Loftus, supra note 2, at 62.
15. Id. at 63.
16. Id. at 63, 70-72.
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systems fall far short of reaching their goal and may do substantial harm
to the coastal communities.
The common property concept underlying the western model does not
comport with the social and cultural realities of many coastal communities
in developing nations. As such, it is not sufficiently sensitive to the
contexts in which fishing occurs, or to the different patterns of human
behavior and motivation that influence fishing and its consequences in
non-western Cultures. 7 In many communities with long maritime or fisheries traditions, fishing is characterized by a high degree of order, with
social regulation of entry, catch, and gear that are well-adapted to the
needs of the community and the preservation of the ecosystem. Traditional
sea tenure systems have operated, and continue to operate, around the
world.' 8 A study of subsistence Cree fishery in northern Canada 9 found
fishing practices well adapted to the sub-arctic ecosystem, which is characterized by unpredictable and large seasonal and annual environmental
fluctuations. There was no rigid territorial system, thus allowing greater
flexibility in catch distribution and maximizing the yield.20 Similarly, gear
was limited to small nets in order to maintain mobility.2' Only certain
areas and depths were fished and mesh.size was limited, allowing regeneration of stocks and minimizing the taking of immature fish.22
A socially enforced territorial reef and lagoon tenure system controlled
the right to fish in particular areas throughout Oceania.23 The Oceania
natives were found to be well aware of the conservation needs of the
fishery and regulated taking by limiting the number of traps allowed,
closing seasons and areas, and allowing escape for regeneration. 24 The
system was responsive to social need; for example, temporary fishing
permission was given to non-user communities which were subject to
poor fishing conditions.' Villages would also cede the rights to surplus
areas of their fishery to less fortunate villages in return for a percentage
of the catch or other arrangement.2 6
The management system of Japanese fisheries combines both com17. Emmerson, Rethinking Artisanal Fisheries Development: Western Concepts, Asian Experiences, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 423 at iv-v (1980).
18. See, e.g., Alexander, Innovation in a Cultural Vacuum, 35 HuM. ORG. 333 (1975), and
Iwakiri, Mataqaliof the Sea-A Study of the Customary Right on Reef andLagoon in Fiji, the South
Pacific, 4 MEM. KAGOSHIMA U. REs. CENTER S. PAC. 133 (1983).
19. Berkes, FisheryResource Use in a Subarctic Indian Community, 5 HuM. ECOL. 289 (1977).
20. Id. at 302.
21. Id. at 293, 303.
22. Id. at 304.
23. Johannes, TraditionalMaritime Conservation Measuresin Oceaniaand TheirDemise, 9 ANN.
REv. ECOLOGY Sys. 349 (1978); see also Iwakiri, supra note 18.
24. Johannes, supra note 23, at 353.
25. Id. at 351.
26. Id.
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munal and private rights.2 7 The community is granted exclusive rights
over coastal fishing grounds by the national government, with the rights
vested in a community fishery association or cooperative for a period of
ten years or so. 28 All households wanting fishing rights are required to
join the association, whereby they automatically acquire the privilege of
fishing the communal waters.29 The association acts as an administrative
and enforcement agency with regard to communal rights."3 The private
rights reserve specific seasons, types of fishing or gear, or specific areas."'
In coastal communities in Sumatra, fishing rights were obtained by
annual auctions for specific areas.32 In addition, the auctions allocated
use rights for fishing from platforms, dropping nets from a frame, using
a motor-powered boat, and using sail-powered vessels.33 The individual
auction winner also wins the right to manage the resources in the area,
including collecting user fees and buying fish from others who harvest
within the auctioned area.34
Most of these systems are based in and enforced by social custom and
are not recorded in law books. Hence, they tend to be overlooked or
ignored as non-authoritative or "not legal" by western-oriented or trained
fisheries planners. Yet, ignoring regulatory systems that are inextricably
intertwined with the social and economic fabric of the community may
preclude successful adoption of contemporary management techniques
and lead to disastrous results.
Additionally, the development scheme exemplified in the FAO program
outlined above calls for a funding orientation toward "efficient" harvesting, including the use of larger boats and new gear technologies. 3
Adverse impacts on the resource and the population cannot be avoided
without consideration of the consequences of introducing this concept of
efficiency into small coastal communities. The breakdown of traditional
tenure and its socio-economic consequences has been chronicled in Pacific
27. Asada, License Limitation Regulations: The Japanese System, 30 J. FISH. REs. BD. CAN.
2085 (1973); see also Comitini, Marine Resource Exploitation and Management in the Economic
Development of Japan, 14 ECON. DEv. CULT. CHANGE 414 (1966); and Chang, InstitutionalChanges
and the Development of the FishingIndustry in a Japanese Island Community, 30 HUM. ORG. 158
(Summer 1971).
28. Asada, supra note 27, at 2088.
29. The rights acquired are monopolistic and are regarded as "rights in rem" (property rights).
Id. at 2087-88.
30. Id. at 2088, 2090.
31. Id. at 2087-89.
32. The auction system is called lelang. W.L. Collier, Development Problems and Conflicts in
the Coastal Zone of Sumatra: Swamps are for People (Sept. 18-22, 1978) (Programmatic Workshop
on Land-Water Interactive Systems, given at U.N. University and Bogor Agric. Univ., Bogor,
Indonesia).
33. Id. at 31.
34. Id. at 31-32.
35. Lucas & Loftus, supra note 2, at 63, 73.
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islands.3 6 In this region conversion of self-sufficient, internally regulated
subsistence fishing economies to money-based export systems destroyed
the conservation ethic inherent in the traditional system and put the population into an unbreakable debt-cycle.37 The development of export markets and an individual profit motive encourages competition among the
fishermen for money and more fish.38 Therefore, the fishermen must buy
better equipment and fish more diligently. No longer constrained by subsistence or local needs, fishing efforts begin to draw down the fishery
stocks. As equipment becomes more sophisticated, its price rises beyond
the means of local fishermen, who are forced to finance and fall into
debt.39 Additionally, employment opportunities dwindle
as more efficient
4°
boats with smaller crews drive out native craft.
The scenario changes somewhat in relation to the location of the fishery,
the sophistication of the artisanal fishermen, the type of fish sought, and
a host of other factors. However, there are certain aspects of this confrontation between local or subsistence fishing and contemporary management that seem rather constant. The contemporary scheme is based
on production and conservation, whereas a prime consideration of artisanal fisheries regulation is based on distribution of catch to community
members. 4 This distinction plays a critical role in the ability of contemporary development and management schemes to address the social and
economic goals of local traditional fisheries. Administrative and structural
configurations of the contemporary development and management models
have the appearance of providing support for fisheries "growth" but
seldom deliver in a meaningful manner. Examples of this failure to provide
meaningful support are government-sponsored cooperative formation and
gear introduction.
The studies of fishing cooperative failures are legion. 2 Several common
factors have been identified with cooperative failure, stemming from
central government organization and control with little regard for local
systems. Local fishermen at Coopepes, Costa Rica resisted a cooperation
hierarchy run by non-fishermen, with the retention of limited individual
control.43 This lack of control ran counter to their traditional, individu36. -Johannes, supra note 23; see also Cordell, Modernization and Marginality, 27 OCEANUS 28
(1973); Cole, Report on Fisheries Development and Requirement of Fishery Education and Training
in Malaysia, Thailand, Fiji, and the Philippines (FAQ Fish Rept. No. 143, 1973).
37. Johannes, supra note 23, at 356.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 356-57.
40. Id. at 357.
41. Emmerson, supra note 17, at 29, i, 57; and Johannes, supra note 23, at 356.
42. See, e.g., Poggie, Small-scale Fishermen'sPsychoculturalCharacteristicsand Cooperative
Formation, 53 ATrrRo. Q. 20 (1980); see also Sabella, supra note 4, and McGoodwin, Mexico's
MarginalInshore Pacific Fishing Cooperatives, 53 ANTrrRO. Q. 43 (1980).
43. Poggie, supra note 42, at 24.
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alistic orientation.' This perception was based on the organization format
of the cooperative, which imposed fishing locations, gear, and boat type
selected by the government-appointed administrators.45
The same factors were cited in the failure of inshore cooperative shrimp
fisheries on the Mexican Pacific coast.46 In addition, the government
withdrew substantial support to these cooperatives and curtailed their
harvest when it decided to develop offshore shrimperies for export, thereby
confirming the structural insensitivity of fisheries management to the local
socioeconomy.4 7
Gear introduction without consideration of local socioeconomic conditions can have significant adverse impact. This situation was described
in studies of traditional fisheries in Brazil. 48 The introduction of nylon
nets to increase fisheries output in order to supply urban areas caused
tremendous disruption of the well-developed system of traditional property rights and community regulation. 9 The new nylon gear was too
expensive for the local population; therefore, urban and local businessmen
purchased the nets and hired fishermen on a salaried basis to conduct the
fishing.5 ° The salaries were not enough to allow fishermen to save toward
purchase of their own equipment, and many fishermen lost control of
their traditional territories."
Introduction of new gear may also upset the catch and conservation
balance that has evolved over time in a given community. In Indonesia
trawlers indiscriminately take a variety of non-targeted fish species and
age-groups, thereby affecting the regenerative capacity of the fishery, as
well as the ability of the artisanal sector to survive.5" There have also
been unsuccessful attempts to mechanize southern Sri Lanka peasant
fisheries by introduction of small vessels powered by inboard engines.53
Although the Sri Lanka fisheries were more than subsistence, a strong
community ethic existed regarding catch division. Fisheries planners ignored this ethic, however, basing their efforts on the implicit assumption
that the values and attitudes of the operators would be those of the urban
44. Id. at 20.
45. Id. at 23-24.
46. See McGoodwin, The Human Costs of Development, 22 ENV'T. 25 (1980), and McGoodwin,
supra note 42.
47. Id. at 44.
48. Cordell, CarryingCapacityAnalysis of Fixed TerritorialFishing, 17 ETHNOLOGY 1 (1978).
49. Id. at 5-6.
50. Id. at 6.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Bailey, Fisheries Resource Conflict and Political Resolution: Indonesia's 1980 Trawl Ban
(Aug. 1984) (paper prepared for the 1984 Rural Sociological Soc. meeting, University of Texas at
Austin).
53. Alexander, Innovation in a Cultural Vacuum: the Mechanization of Sri Lanka Fisheries, 34
Hum. ORG. 334 (1975).
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mercantile community. 4 Furthermore, the different traditional technologies in Sri Lanka were adapted to distinct ecological niches; beach seining"5
was directed toward anchovies and sardine-like small fish, small rowing
outrigger canoes handlined 6 for medium-sized mackerel and perch-like
fish, while deep-sea sailing outriggers fished for tuna, mackerel, shark,
and demersal (i.e., bottom dwelling) species. Introduction of the motorized fleet impacted beach seining by requiring additional anchorage space,
thereby displacing a number of seiners." Since seining provided subsistence income for otherwise surplus labor, displacement raised local unemployment. 8 Similarly, the mechanized craft displaced locally-built
outriggers, thereby eliminating work for local craftsmen and women, as
well as a number of crewmen. 9 The high cost of mechanized craft was
addressed by a centralized, government-instituted borrowing scheme.'
The fixed payments plan contrasted sharply with the flexible arrangement
whereby local financiers would finance craft but allow repayment to mirror
catch levels. 6' While the catch in Sri Lanka increased substantially, so
did costs, unemployment, and inequality of wealth distribution in the
impacted coastal villages.6 2 Additionally, government technical assistance
was limited to operations training, leaving the villagers with the problems
of creating completely new institutions to enable them to purchase additional equipment, distribute earnings, and repair and replace worn-out
and damaged mechanical equipment. 3
The Sri Lanka situation is a strong example of how administrative and
structural factors may inhibit successful implementation of contemporary
fisheries management in coastal communities. The western model, in its
over-reliance on economic efficiency in exploitation, ignores critical factors in the developing world that may not be as significant a problem in
western or more developed nations. These factors include the lack of
alternative employment opportunities in small coastal communities,' and
54. Id. at 338.
55. A beach seine is a long rectangular net weighted along the bottom (the "landline"), with
wooden or cork floats along the top (the "corkline"). One end remains on the beach while the other
is walked, or taken by boat, offshore. The seiners maneuver the net into a large circle, returning
the floating end to the beach. The net is then hauled to the beach, retrieving whatever fish were
encircled by the net and captured. A good primer on fishing gear and methodology is SAINESBURY,
CoMMERcIAL FIsriNG MEMODs-AN INTRODUCrnoN TO VEssELs AND GEARs (1975).
56. "Handlining" is the use of a single line with baited hook.
57. Alexander, supra note 53, at 342.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 339, 342.
60. Id. at 337-38.
61. Id. at 339-40.
62. Id. at 341-42.
63. Id. at 335.
64. See, e.g., Crutchfield, Economic and Social Implications of the Main Policy Alternativesfor
ControllingFishing Effort, 36 J. FISH Rs. BD. oF CAN. 742 (1979).
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the lack of marketing facilities or infrastructure.65 Additionally, fisheries
departments in developing nations are generally staffed with westerntrained or oriented technical personnel, and the management planning
and institution are not geared toward inclusion of social and cultural
considerations.66
Furthermore, the national and international structure of lending that
supports fisheries development in these nations is largely biased toward
large-scale, export-oriented expansion efforts.67 Institutional support is
geared in this direction for several reasons, including the general bias
toward large-scale fish harvest technologies under the western approach
to management 6 combined with institutional fixation on "economic efficiency" with its presumed contribution to overall economic growth.6 9
Large-scale fisheries can concentrate in a few landing areas, which allows
economies of scale in the provision of infrastructure and the delivery of
assistance programs.70 There is also the "visibility" factor" which often
affects international assistance decisions.' Government taxation and credit
policies often encourage large-scale development to the disadvantage of
the artisanal sector. For example, it has been reported that government
taxes on diesel fuel used by commercial trawlers are significantly lower
than prices for regular gasoline used by artisanal fishermen in the Phil65. Such as processing plants, refrigerator trucks and equipment, and roads. See Ruckes, Marketing Aspects of the Development of Small-Scale Fisheries, 19 INDO-PAcIFIc FISHERIES COUNCIL
PRoc. 955, 961 (1980).
66. These factors are discussed by Pollnac & Littlefield, SocioculturalAspects of FisheriesManagement, 12 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 209 (1983). It should be noted that these problems are not
limited to the developing world. Failure to consider social and cultural factors have been identified
in the failure of American attempts to develop New England offshore fisheries. See BOERI & GIaSON,
TELL IT GOODBYE, KIDo: THE DECLINE OF THE NEw ENGLAND OFFSHORE FISHERY (1976).

67. I.e., government planners have favored large-scale and capital-intensive operations in Malaysia and Indonesia, including state-operated commercial fisheries enterprises whose activities conflict with capture by small-scale fishermen. Yahaya, Capture Fisheries in Peninsular Malaysia:
Lessons from MAJUIKAN's Experience, 5 MARINE POL'Y 322 (1981). A similar bias has been found
in Thailand. See Panayotou, Economic Conditions and Prospectsof Small-scale Fishermen in Thailand, 4 MARINE POL'Y 142, 144-45 (1980).
International aid to Indonesia and the Philippines has export production as the major objective.
Sfuer-Younis & Donaldson, Fishery Sector Pol'y Paper 8, 48 (World Bank, Wash. D.C. 1982); and
see Asian Development Bank, Operations in the Fisheries Sector 5-7, Appendix 5 (Manila, 1979)
(demonstrating that only 12 percent of the aid for fisheries projects prior to 1979 was for vessels
less than 20 gross tons).
68. See, e.g., Emmerson, supra note 17, at 4-5.
69. Panayotou, supra note 9, at 26; Bailey, Managing an Open-Access Resource: The Case of
Coastal Fisheries, in PEOPLE CENTERED DEVELOPMENT 98 (D. Korten & B. Klauss eds. 1984).
70. Panayotou, supra note 9, at 26.
71. The "visibility factor" refers to the apparent desire of international assistance agencies and
national decisionmakers to provide large-scale, visible products of development assistance, such as
hydroelectric plants or new trawler fleets, rather than instituting low visibility, long-term growth
projects such as soil replenishment or fish programs.
72. A thorough review of the mechanics of decisionmaking in one major international assistance
organization can be found in PAYER, THE WORLD BANK-A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1982).
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ippines. 73 If the fuel tax structure was the same, trawlers would be incurring substantial losses instead of earning large profits.74
Of course, this orientation is not completely unwarranted in light of
the export potential of fisheries and the cash needs of developing nations.
However, the orientation substantially contributes to the negative aspects
of fisheries development and masks the real costs of following the western
model. The growing export orientation of developing nations fisheries
regimes sheds light on the darker side of claims for a greater share in
the living resources of the oceans.7 5
Although the extension of coastal state authority over fisheries resources
has tremendous potential for the developing world, overreliance on export-oriented development may pass the benefits of the new system to
the developed world without broad-based, lasting growth and development for the exporting nations. There is a very lively debate as to whether,
or to what extent, developing nations should participate in the global
economy as resource suppliers, and the effects such participation may
have on their ability to provide for their own populations.76 The fisheries
development policy chosen has serious ramifications in this debate. The
present policies may lead to higher gross national products for developing
nations in the short-term, but the figures would hide the maldistribution
of that new income and the human costs of cultural dislocation. Additionally, the overharvesting of the national fisheries for export will eventually deplete the resource or, as in the Mexican shrimpery,77 deny it to
a needy local populace.
Yet developing nations want national growth, and small-scale fishing
communities are often deep pockets of poverty. Must development ignore
local need? How caln a development and management regime be structured
to accommodate both national growth demands and strengthened local
economies without the destructive results outlined above?
Steps Toward an AppropriateFisheries Development Regime
Fisheries must not be developed in a social and economic vacuum. In
order to reap the full benefits of extended coastal authority, fishery de73. Smith & Mines, Implicationsfor Equity and Management, in SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES OF SAN
MIGUEL BAY, PHILIPPINES: ECONOMICS OF PRODUCTION AND MARKETING 139 (8 ICLARM Tech. Rep.)
(I. Smith & A. Mines eds. 1982).
74. I.Smith, D.Pauly & A. Mines, Small-Scale Fisheriesof San MiguelBay, Philippines:Options
for Management and Research 11 ICLARM TECH. REP. 58 (1983).
75. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Amin, Self-Reliance and the New InternationalEconomic Order, 29 MONTHLY
REV. 1 (1977); and Nugent & Yotopoulos, OrthodoxDevelopment Economics versus the Dynamics
of Concentration and Marginalization in PEOPLE CENTERED DEVELOPMENT 107 (D. Korten & R.
Klauss eds. 1984).
77. MeGoodwin, The Human Costs of Development, 22 ENV'T 25 (1980).
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velopment must be tied to local and regional growth.7" Otherwise, this
growth will occur only as a secondary by-product to investment in other
national sectors. If export earnings are received at the national or largescale commercial level they would reach local communities in a "trickle
down" manner which has rarely been shown to occur beyond theory.79
There are many advantages to locally-centered fisheries development.
First, local orientation makes distribution of benefits more likely and
immediate, thus providing truly broad-based growth potential. Concomitantly, local orientation may inhibit the widening of income gaps between
urban and rural coastal areas which is often the product of industrialization
or large-scale development."0 Locally-centered development may take
advantage of local knowledge regarding fishery conditions and provide
assistance in information gathering and enforcement functions which are
vital to successful management. Strengthening the authority and ability
of local fishermen to police resource use serves several primary functions.
First, it encourages participation in the management of the resource and
gives the population a sense that management is a proper and locally
meaningful activity. As one author noted, successful management requires
that "a fisherman must not be able to continue to regard regulation as
some alien restraint imposed upon him for purposes he does not recognize.""' It also relieves the government of a potentially substantial regulatory responsibility that would place additional burdens on generally
understaffed and underfunded policy or fisheries enforcement departments.8 2 Finally, locally-centered development that utilizes local understandings of and relationships to fisheries stocks may prevent exhaustion
of those stocks and related societal disruptions.
The major criteria for an "appropriate fisheries development" model
(AFD) would be a combination of production, conservation, and distribution aspects, each of which influences and affects the others. The
production aspect should be redefined from strictly economic efficiency
of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) s3 which does not account for the
78. See, e.g., Sinclair, supra note 11, at 312 and Ben-Yami, supra note 5, at 940-41.
79. COCHRANE, THE CULTURAL APPRAISAL OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 4 (1979).
80. The process of growth in metropolitan centers as a result of the appropriation of the economic
surplus (e.g., earning potential from the export sale of fish) of rural communities has been described
by Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment, 18 MONTHLY REV. 17 (1966); see also GONZALESCASANOVA, DEMOCRACY IN MExIco (Salti trans. 1970); FRANK, CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD (1981);

and Lipton, Urban Bias in World Development, PEOPLE CENTERED DEV. 152-54 (D. Korten & R.
Klauss eds. 1984).
81. Kesteven, Management of the Exploitation of Fishery Resources, WORLD FISHERIES POLICY:
MULTIDISCIPLINARY ViEws 230 (Rothschild ed. 1972).

82. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 69, at 101-02.
83. Maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is the largest average catch or yield that can continuously
be taken from a fish stock under existing environmental conditions without over-harvesting or
depleting the fish resources. See RICKER, COMPUTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF BIOLOGICAL STATISTICS OF FISH POPULATIONS (1975).
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many social costs, to a more encompassing framework. Maximum social
yield (MScY) has been suggested as a proper goal for fisheries management in developing nations.' MScY takes into consideration lack of
occupational and geographic mobility of local fishing populations, the
subsistence orientation of many artisanal or traditional fishermen, and
weighs the income distributional benefits of small-scale versus large-scale
operations.
In-depth understanding of conservation requirements of a species cannot be hypothecated at a national level. Since fisheries populations vary
by area, season, time, and other factors, local ecosystemic knowledge
must be incorporated into management regimes. As we have seen, traditional tenure and technique have an immediate relationship to species
conservation, and must be investigated and employed to facilitate AFD.
Artisanal techniques have tremendous production and conservation potential. For example, some species have relatively high potential yield
but are spread thin.85 Commercial harvesting either destroys large numbers
of non-target stocks to retrieve these species, or spends inordinate time,
effort, and fuel to do so. 86 Exploitation by artisanal fishermen makes both
economic and ecologic sense in this situation. Similarly, the danger of
over-exploitation of highly-prized or scarce species 7 may be lessened by
limiting capture to artisanal fishermen with appropriate gear. In terms of
employment potential and local development, artisanal or small-scale
fisheries may have a more lasting, if more slowly-paced, effect on both
local and national growth. These fisheries provide a continuous, reasonably-priced supply of fish products to rural and coastal areas and other
domestic markets without expensive preservation and transportation systems. A carefully conceived and implemented plan for incremental growth
of fisheries-related infrastructure at the local, then regional, level would
minimize the socioeconomic and ecological disruption, and maximize the
overall benefit for both the local and national communities.
Thus, a successful AFD model would require a close and continual
collaboration between national or outside specialists and local communities. It would require a clarification of authority and control that would
recognize the propriety of horizontal, community-wide participation and
administration in order to reorient national growth away from the trickledown theory of gross national product (GNP) statistics, and toward meaningful indices of development such as relief from poverty, unemployment,
and unequal distrubution of wealth.
The basis for the AFD model would be collective management of the
84.
85.
86.
87.

T. Panayotou, supra note 9, at 3.
Sabella, supra note 4, at 62.
Id. at 62.
Such as grouper; see id. at 62.
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fishery commons according to rules established by the local community."8
The governing community body for this purpose should reflect existing
local decisionmaking authority. The relevant area of control, the means
of distributing catch or regulating access, and the primary techniques for
harvesting should be predicated upon traditional tenures and rules which
can be operative after in-depth analysis by multidisciplinary teams of
specialists. 9 This is not to say that all fishing should be at artisanal levels,
or that fishing communities should be encapsulated from the rest of the
nation. Rather, the purpose of this local orientation is to recognize the
need to mitigate the socioeconomic and ecological consequences of the
rush to embrace western management and technologies. Traditional tenures and techniques have evolved over time in specific relation and balance
to relevant local circumstance. Fisheries based upon community control
will continue to evolve in order to fit contemporary circumstances, if this
development is uninhibited by centralized government decisionmaking.
Scientific determination of MScY will be essential to incorporation of
this localized fisheries regime into a national development scheme. Again
with local assistance, MScY can be determined for species, area, and
season. Community needs in regard to food, employment effect, and
other factors may be included to determine a MScY, and to determine
what part of the MScY harvest can be allocated to export without damaging the local economy. The community may also wish to allocate part
of its local catch for export or other external market sales. The "surplus"
catch potential within a specific area can be leased or auctioned seasonally
to local or non-local concerns. User fees may fund gear replacement or
upgrading, a credit pool for local fishermen with flexible repayment tied
to catch, or infrastructure improvement. As harvesting increases within
the MScY, the community may decide on new gear introduction. Change,
of course, is inevitable and can be welcome when regulated or monitored
to minimize adverse impact. Finally, both national governments and international lending and assistance institutions should "unstack the deck"
and promote steady, localized development and growth of fisheries. Although the visibility may not be as high, nor the cash flow in return as
immediate, such a reorientation would contribute substantially to a developing nation's ability to harvest the maximum social and economic
bounty from extended coastal jurisdiction.
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